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1 Introduction
This paper sheds light on how labour market unionisation a¤ects the competitive
selection e¤ects of international trade and wage dispersion.
A considerable body of work highlights the role of intra-industry competitive
selection in determining aggregate export performance whereby the bulk of
exports are accounted for by a relatively small number of rms that are more
productive and larger than others, but that also pay higher wages (e.g. Mayer
and Ottaviano 2008). Consistent with these stylised facts, existing empirical
evidence suggests that rm heterogeneity may be a key channel through which
trade liberalisation contributes to the increasing wage inequality observed in-
ternationally1 particularly in light of the fact that a large proportion of this
inequality occurs in most countries within-groups and not only between groups
of workers with di¤erent observable characteristics (such as skills and educa-
tion).2 The e¤ects of international trade on the equilibrium size-distribution
and export status of rms, however, also appear to be inuenced by other fac-
tors such as changes in the market power of rms (e.g. Wälde and Weiß2007),
or labour market liberalisation (e.g. Cos¸ar et al 2010).
A key stylised fact that motivates this paper is that across the OECD ris-
ing wage dispersion has been paralleled by falling degrees of centralisation of
collective bargaining (OECD 1994,1997, 2004). Even in countries with tra-
ditionally centralised industrial relation systems such as Germany and Italy,
industry level negotiations have increasingly given way to rm and plant-level
agreements since at least the mid 1990s.3 The adoption of highly decentralised
bargaining practices has typically been motivated by the need to ensure, in the
interest of international competitiveness, that wage settlements reect variations
in productivity and protability across both rms and prot-centres (or divi-
sions) within individual rms which industry level agreements are perceived
as failing to recognize.
To capture these stylized facts, we develop a framework in which compet-
itive pressure, and hence markups, are both rm-specic and market-specic,
and wages are set via bargaining between unions and rms which can occur
at the sub-rm (i.e. prot-centre) level. Specically, we extend the Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) model to examine how the interplay between unionisation and
trade liberalisation a¤ects intra-industry selection.
A large body of literature highlights the e¤ects of inter-rm productivity dif-
ferences on export performance.4 Recently, attention has been devoted to the
interaction between rmsselection and labour markets, but most papers do not
focus on the role of unions as a source of labour market imperfections.5 Union-
ization is considered, but with a focus on multinational production, by Eckel and
Egger (2009) who nd wages to be the same for all rms, with a wage premium
paid by exporters. Furthermore, with the exception of Helpman and Itskhoki
(2010) and Helpman et al (2010) who allow for inter-country asymmetries in
the degree of labour market frictions, all the above mentioned works di¤er from
our model by assuming fully symmetric countries. Clearly, any rent-sharing
mechanism between workers and rms can lead to the emergence of inter-rm
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wage dispersion. Our choice to focus on unionisation is motivated by the key
role that unions continue to play, despite a decline in union membership, in
most industrial economies (see, e.g., Visser 2006).
Our ndings enrich the literature in this area. With endogenous markups
and rm-heterogeneity, wage bargaining results in more e¢ cient rms paying
higher wages. This is consistent with the results obtained by Egger and Kre-
ickemeier (2009) and others. However, in our model, the rent extracted by a
union does not only depend on the productivity of the rm but also on its
market power which is rm specic. Since a rms price elasticity of demand
decreases in its productivity, more e¢ cient rms enjoy a stronger monopoly po-
sition in the industry and o¤er a higher potential for rent extraction to their
union. Due to market segmentation, the monopoly power of rms is also mar-
ket specic with an exporter having two independent prot-centres associated
with its domestic and export sales respectively. In this context, a decentrali-
sation of bargaining at the sub-rm (i.e. prot-centre) level alters rent-sharing
incentives and results in wage discrimination across the di¤erent activities of
the rm, as unions moderate their export wage requests in order to aid their
rms access to foreign markets. A key implications of our results, therefore, is
that trade liberalisation can a¤ect within-group intra-industry wage inequality
along two dimensions: across rms (via its e¤ects on competitive selection) and
within rms (via wage discrimination across destination markets). As argued
by Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), to the extent that rm-heterogeneity in pro-
ductivity leads to wage dispersion within industries, workers are not indi¤erent
as to which rm they are employed by. Our analysis further suggests that work-
ers may also not be indi¤erent as to which operation of an e¢ cient rm they
work in.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a closed
economy version of the model and derives its long-run equilibrium properties.
Section 3 extends the framework to a two-country world. Section 4 concludes
the paper and draws out some of the key testable hypotheses that emerge from
the analysis.
2 Autarky
We consider an economy populated by L identical households supplying labour
services to a competitive industry, that produces a homogeneous good (used as
the numeraire), and to a monopolistically competitive industry, that produces
a horizontally di¤erentiated good. The model is based on Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) which we extend by assuming that workers in the monopolistic sector
are organized in rm-specic unions that bargain with rms over the wage.
3
2.1 Preferences
The utility function of the representative household is:
U(q0 ; q
(i); i 2 
) = q0+
Z
i2

q(i)di  1
2

Z
i2

q(i)2di  1
2

0@Z
i2

q(i)di
1A2 , (1)
where q(i) is household  0s consumption of variety i 2 
 of the di¤erentiated
good and q0 is its consumption of the homogeneous good; ,  and  are positive
preference parameters. Specically:  captures the degree of consumersbias
towards product di¤erentiation (i.e. towards a dispersed consumption of vari-
eties); both  and  capture the intensity of preferences for the di¤erentiated
good relative to the homogeneous good (which increases in  and decreases in
); a higher  also reects a higher degree of substitutability between varieties.
Denoting with ~
  
 the subset of varieties that are consumed, and setting
the price of the homogenous good at unity, the budget constraint of a typical
household is given by
Z
i2~

p(i)q(i)di + q0 = I + q0, where I and q0 are its
income and initial endowment of the numeraire, and p(i) is the price of variety
i.6 Each household supplies one unit of labour inelastically that can be hired
by both a rm in the monopolistic sector and by producers in the competitive
sector,7 obtaining an income I = w(i)l(i) +w0l

0 where w and l
(i), and w0
and l0 = 1   l(i) are the wage rate and the amount of work performed in the
monopolistic sector and in the competitive sector, respectively.8
Constrained maximisation of (1) yields the inverse individual demand for
each di¤erentiated variety; inverting it and aggregating over households gives
the demand function facing each rm i:
q(i) = L


( + N)
  1

p(i) +

 ( + N)
N p

; (2)
where q(i) = Lq(i), and N is the measure of consumed varieties in ~
 with
average price p = 1N
Z
i2~

p(i)di. The price threshold for the demand for a variety
to be positive is:
pmax  ( + N p)
 + N
, (3)
which can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the toughness of competition
in the industry and is positively related to p and negatively related to N .
Demand is independent of income. However, the price elasticity of demand,
q;p(i), is not constant and does not solely depend on the degree of product
di¤erentiation, as in the CES framework, but is also increasing in the toughness
of competition in the industry: from (2) and (3), for a given price p(i), q;p(i) =
j@ log q(i)=@ log p(i)j = [(pmax=p(i))  1] 1 which falls in pmax. For a given pmax,
q;p(i) will be higher the higher is p(i).
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2.2 Production
Labour is the only factor of production. In the competitive sector, one unit of
good requires one unit of labour.
Prior to entry into the monopolistic sector, ex-ante identical rms incur a
xed cost fE in terms of the homogeneous good to set up plants and production
lines and to perform the research and development (R&D) activity underpinning
the introduction of a new variety. fE is an irreversible investment, identical for
all entrants, which is sunk after entry. Given the uncertainty characterising
the outcome of R&D e¤orts, it is only after paying fE that a rm learns how
productive its technology is by drawing c from a cumulative distribution, G(c).
Since rms with the same cost parameter c are symmetric, we index rms by c
alone. After entry, production occurs according to a constant returns to scale
technology q(c) = l(c)=c, where l is the rms labour demand and c is its unit
labour requirement. A typical rm then has marginal production cost w(c)c
and operating prots (c) = [p(c)  w(c)c] q(c), where w(c) is the wage it pays
its workers. Due to the assumption of a continuum of rms in the industry, a
rm takes the number of competitors and the industry average price as given.
The price and the quantity which solve the rms maximisation problem must
satisfy the following relationships:
q(c) =
L

[p(c)  w(c)c] : (4)
Given the demand equation in (2), (4) then implies the optimal price:
p(c) =
w(c)c
2
+
 + N p
2 ( + N)
. (5)
Substituting (4) into (c), maximized operating prots are:
(c) =
L

[p(c)  w(c)c]2 . (6)
The rms labour demand is obtained by substituting equation (4) into the
production function:
l(c) =
Lc

[p(c)  w(c)c] , (7)
which can then be used to rewrite (6) as:
(c) =

Lc2
l2(c). (8)
Given that fE is sunk after entry, only rms capable of covering their marginal
cost (i.e. with p(c)  w(c)c) survive in the market. For active rms, p(c) 
pmax which, given (5), requires w(c)c  pmax. Thus, the lower is pmax (and
the tougher is competition in the industry), the lower is the marginal cost that
allows rms to break-even.
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2.3 Unions
In the homogenous good sector, the labour market is perfectly competitive and
all employers pay the same wage w0.9 Since the price of the good and the
unit labour requirement are both unity, w0 = 1. Labour in the monopolistic
sector is unionized according to a right-to-manage model in which employment
is determined unilaterally by the rm and the wage is determined via negotiation
with a rm-specic union by solving the following Nash bargain subject to (8),
(7), and (5):
max
w(c)
 = v log [V (w(c); l(c))] + (1  v) log [ (w(c); l(c))  0(c)] , (9)
where 0 < v  1 is the unions bargaining power10 , V (w(c); l(c)) = l(c)[w(c) 
1] is its total labour rent above the competitive wage paid to non-unionized
workers, and 0(c) is the rms reservation prot. Without loss of generality,
we set 0(c) = 0.11 The resulting optimal wage rule is then:
w(c) = 1 +
2v
(v + 2) c
[p(c)  c] . (10)
For expressions (4) and (6) to be positive, it must be the case that p(c)  w(c)c
which, given (10), holds if and only if p(c)  c. This, in turn, implies that
w(c)  w0 = 1. As is clear from (10), there emerges a distribution of rm
specic wages (above the reservation wage) that depend on the cost parameter
of rms.
2.4 The long-run autarkic equilibrium
Entry into the industry continues until a rms expected prots are driven to
zero, i.e.:
R cD
0
(c)dG(c) = fE . This entry condition identies a cut-o¤ level,
cD, of c at which a rm just breaks-even, dened by the zero-prot condition:
cD  sup fc : (cD) = 0g : (11)
Substituting (10) into (6), and the resulting expression into (11) yields:
(cD) = 0() p(cD) = cDw(cD), (12)
where p(cD) and w(cD) are the price and wage of marginal rms with c = cD.
Entrants with c  cD remain in the market and start producing: of these, the
non-marginal rms (with c < cD) earn gross (of the entry cost) positive prots.
Entrants with c > cD exit the market and forego the entry cost.
The wage paid by the marginal rms equals the competitive wage, i.e.
w(cD) = 1, as is evident by substituting (12) into (10). Thus, recalling that
(cD) = 0 implies p(cD) = cD, the optimal prices, output levels, prots, markup
(dened as the di¤erence between price and marginal cost) and wage can now
6
be written as functions of cD:
p(c) =
(v + 2) cD + (2  v) c
4
, q(c) =
(2  v)L
4
(cD   c) ; (13)
(c) =
L (2  v)2 (cD   c)2
16
, (c) =
1
4
(2  v) (cD   c) ,
w(c) = 1 +
v
2
cD
c
  1

Clearly, for a given v, rms with a lower c set lower prices, sell larger quantities,
and have higher prots and markups than less productive rms, despite the fact
that they also pay higher wages. The intuition for the negative relationship
between w and c is that more productive rms, that have lower price elasticities
of demand (since: @q;p(c)=@c > 0), enjoy a stronger monopoly positions in the
product market and o¤er their unions a higher potential for rent extraction.
Furthermore, unions in lower cost rms face a lower wage elasticity of labour
demand  i.e. @l;w(c)=@c > 0, where l;w(c) = j@ log l(c)=@ logw(c)j; hence,
given the trade-o¤ between wage and employment, the incentive for unions to
bid up wages increases as c falls. Thus, unionisation weakens the relative cost
advantage of high productivity rms.
We adopt a Pareto distribution as the specic parameterization ofG(c), with:
G(c) = (c=cM )

; c 2 [0; cM ], where cM is the upper bound of c and the shape
parameter   1 indexes its dispersion. The average draw of entrants is then:
c = cM=(+1), with variance c=[(+2)]. Making use of this parametarisation
in the zero-prot free-entry condition we obtain the cut-o¤ level of c:12
cD =
"
8 (+ 1) (+ 2) fEc

M
L (2  v)2
#1=(+2)
, (14)
and the average levels of all rm performance variables:
c =

+ 1
cD, p =
(4+ v + 2)
4 (+ 1)
cD,  =
1
4
(2  v) cD
(+ 1)
(15)
q =
(2  v)L
4 (k + 1)
cD,  =
L (v   2)2 c2D
8 (+ 1) (+ 2)
, w = 1 +
v
2 (  1) .
Noting that for the marginal rms it must be the case that pD = pmax = cD,
substitution of p from (15) into (3) allows to determine the number of rms
selling in the economy as N = [4 (+ 1) ] (  cD) = [ (2  v) cD], with N > 0
i¤  > cD, and the number of entrants from NE = N=G(cD).
The e¤ects of an increase in union power on the industry equilibrium are
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 An increase in the bargaining power of unions v: (i) increases
the cut-o¤ value of c; (ii) increases average prices, and reduces average markups,
and prots; (iii) increases wage dispersion; and (iv) increases the mass of rms
selling in the economy, if  > (+ 2) cD=.
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Proof. (i) and (ii) follow from inspection of (14) and (15); (iii) is evident using
w from (15) to obtain the variance of wages, 2w = v
2=
h
4 (  1)2 (  2)
i
,
which increases in v; (iv) follows from inspection of the expression for N .
Thus, the stronger are unions the lower is the minimum level of productivity
required to survive in equilibrium. This amounts to a selection-softening e¤ect
of union power via a reduction in the toughness of competition within the indus-
try which leads to greater entry of relatively less e¢ cient rms. The intutition
for this is that not only do more productive rms pay higher wages, but their
wage is also more responsive to changes in v (i.e. the elasticity of w(c) with re-
spect to v falls in c: @w;v(c)=@c < 0, where: w;v(c) = @ logw(c)=@ log v). Thus,
for a given cD, a higher v leads to relatively larger wage demand increases in
relatively more productive rms  i.e. it hurts (via higher costs) these rms
relatively more than less e¢ cient rms, redistributing market shares towards
the latter. This change in the e¢ ciency composition of the industry, in turn, is
accompanied by a counter-competitive e¤ect reected in a lower average level of
productivity (i.e. a higher c), higher average prices (p), lower average quantities
(q), and a reduction in both the average markup () and prot (). Through
its e¤ect on cD, an increase in v also has a wage inequality e¤ect reected in
greater intra-industry wage dispersion. However, if the preference for varieties
(reected by ) is su¢ ciently strong, an increase in v may also have a pro-variety
e¤ect by allowing a larger mass of rms to survive in equilibrium.
The implication of this analysis is that, as we show in Appendix A1, the ef-
fects of an increase in union power on welfare (measured by the indirect utility
function associated with (1)) are not unambiguous. This is because when prefer-
ences for variety are su¢ ciently strong, the pro-variety e¤ect of an increase in v
works towards an increase in consumer welfare (and in higher average household
incomes) and thus goes towards o¤setting its selection-softening and counter-
competitive e¤ects (that result in a lower average productivity and hence in
higher average prices) on welfare.13
3 Two-Country World
In this section we examine how international di¤erences in union bargaining
power between two countries (home and foreign) a¤ect inter-market linkages and
relative performance. An asterisk refers to foreign variables and the subscriptsD
and X denote variables associated with domestic and export sales, respectively.
For ease of exposition, whenever appropriate, the model will be discussed with
reference to the home country only.
The two economies are assumed to be symmetric both in consumer pref-
erences and in production technologies, but we allow for asymmetries in pop-
ulation size, trade barriers and union bargaining power. The numeraire good
is assumed to be freely traded. Thus, the wage in the perfectly competitive
sector will equal one in both countries. In the monopolistic sector, markets
are segmented and trade occurs at a per-unit cost  > 1 and  > 1 incurred
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by domestic and foreign exporters, respectively. Hence, the delivery cost of a
variety produced with cost w(c)c is w(c)c.
In each country, rms entering the monopolistic sector draw their unit labour
requirement coe¢ cients c simultaneously from an identical Pareto distribution
G(c) after having paid the xed entry cost fE ; a rm then decides whether to
produce or not, and whether to export or not, depending on the prots it expects
to earn at home and abroad, conditional on the productivity distribution of the
successful entrants.
Due to market segmentation, the price threshold for positive demand is
market-specic:
pmax  ( + N p)
 + N
and pmax 
( + Np)
 + N
: (16)
i.e. a rm faces di¤erent competitive pressures, and enjoys di¤erent monopoly
powers, on its domestic and export markets. Given the constant returns to
scale technology, an exporter has two separate prot centres and maximises two
independent prots, D(c) and X(c), linked to production for the domestic and
export market respectively. The resulting prices, markups and price elasticities
of demand are prot-centre (or market) specic. The rms labour demands to
produce for the two markets are:
lD(c) =
Lc

[pD(c)  w(c)c] and lX(c) = L
c

[pX(c)  w(c)c] , (17)
which can be used to write the maximized prots as:
D(c) =
 [lD(c)]
2
Lc2
and X(c) =
 [lX(c)]
2
Lc2
. (18)
Firms produce for the domestic market if, and only if, D(c)  0, and export
to the foreign market if, and only if, X(c)  0.
3.1 Unions
The market-specicity of an exporters monopoly power implies that not only
will the rent extraction ability of unions vary between rms but also between
the di¤erent activities (or prot centres) of a rm.
The need for wage settlements to reect variations in protability not only
among rms but also between prot-centres within individual rms has moti-
vated the drive across the OECD towards a decentralisation of wage bargaining,
with individual rms signing di¤erent contracts with unions (Kamakura 2006).
Above-average numbers of agreements per-rm (with their number typically
increasing in the size of the establishment) can be found in the chemical, elec-
tricity, energy, metalworking, telecommunications and electronics industries; for
example, in Finland 90% of chemical rms have on average 13 contracts (Ka-
makura 2006).14 Local bargaining is particularly dominant in the export sector,
where the perceived competitive pressure on rms is higher (Jackson 2006).
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Existing analyses of decentralised wage bargaining have mostly focussed on
rm level bargaining, in which negotiations result in a unique wage for all the
labour employed by the rm. To capture the stylised facts discussed above,
we instead consider primarily the prot-centre level bargaining regime, in which
each rm-union pair bargains separately over the wage paid to workers employed
in the domestic and in the export prot centres respectively. The two regimes
are compared in Appendix A4.15
The Nash bargaining problem for rms producing only for the domestic
market is given by (9) which is solved subject to the prot in (18) and the
unions total labour rent to yield:
wD(c) = 1 +
2v
(v + 2)c
[pD(c)  c] , (19)
that has the same functional form as the autarkic wage.
For exporting rms, prot-centre level bargaining results in a domestic and
in an export wage, wD(c) and wX(c) respectively. The former, determined by
solving the same bargaining problem of a non-exporter, is given by (19). The
wage paid to workers producing for the export market is obtained by solving:
max
wX(c)
X = v log [lX(c) (wX(c)  1)] + (1  v) log
"
 [lX(c)]
2
Lc2
#
,
subject to (17):
wX(c) = 1 + 2
v
(v + 2) c

pX(c)

  c

. (20)
It is easy to verify that pX(c)  c; (20) then implies that wX(c)  1.
3.2 The long-run two-country equilibrium
As in autarky, free entry and exit into the industry drive expected prots to zero
in equilibrium. The possibility of exporting, however, results in the emergence
of two cut-o¤s for c, cD and cX , associated with the marginal domestic-only rms
and with the marginal exporters, respectively. For a given mass of entrants NE ,
a mass of rms ND = G(cD)NE sells only in the domestic market and a mass
of rms NX = G(cX)NE also exports. Imposing the (zero-prot) conditions for
the two sets of marginal rms yields:
D(cD) = 0() pD(cD) = wD(cD)cD, (21)
X(cX) = 0() pX(cX) = wX(cX)cX ,
where pD(cD) and wD(cD), and pX(cX) and wX(cX), are prices and wages
of the marginal domestic-only and exporting rms, respectively. From (21),
it is clear that both types of marginal rms pay the competitive wage, i.e.:
wD(cD) = wX(cX) = 1, which in turn implies that (21) can be rewritten as:
pD(cD) = cD and pX(cX) = cX . (22)
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Given (22), the wages in (19) and (20), the optimal domestic and export
prices and output levels can be written as functions of the cut-o¤s:
pD(c) =
(v + 2) cD + (2  v) c
4
, qD(c) =
(2  v)L
4
(cD   c) , (23)
pX(c) =
 [(v + 2) cX + (2  v) c]
4
, qX(c) =
 (2  v)L
4
(cX   c) ,
with maximized prot levels respectively given by:
D(c) =
L (2  v)2 (cD   c)2
16
and X(c) =
2L (2  v)2 (cX   c)2
16
(24)
Similarly, the absolute markups obtained from domestic and export sales can
be written as D(c) = (2  v) (cD   c)=4 and X(c) =  (2  v) (cX   c) =4.
Substituting prices from (23) into (19) and (20), yields:
wD(c) = 1 +
v
2
cD
c
  1

and wX(c) = 1 +
v
2
cX
c
  1

. (25)
For given v and  , a lower c gives rms a stronger monopoly position in their
market (be it domestic or foreign) and thus o¤ers their unions a higher potential
for rent extraction and, due to a lower wage elasticity of labour demand, a
higher incentive to set higher wages. Despite this, however, rms with a lower
c set lower prices, sell larger quantities, have higher prots and charge higher
(absolute) markups than less e¢ cient rms in both their domestic and export
markets.
3.2.1 The e¢ ciency cut-o¤s and market structure
With international trade, the two countriese¢ ciency cut-o¤s are determined
jointly. For the home country, the zero expected prot condition is:
R cD
0
D(c)dG(c)+R cX
0
X(c)dG(c) = fE . Given (21) and wD(cD) = wX(cX) = 1, we obtain:
cX =
cD

. (26)
Combining (26) with the zero expected prot conditions for both countries yields
their domestic and export cut-o¤s. For the home country, these are:16
cD =
8<:8c

M (+ 1) (+ 2) fE
h
(2  v)2   (2  v)2 
i
L (2  v)2 (2  v)2 (1  )
9=;
1
+2
, (27)
and
cX = 
1

8<:8c

M (+ 1) (+ 2) fE
h
(2  v)2   (2  v)2 
i
L (2  v)2 (2  v)2 (1  )
9=;
1
+2
; (28)
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where     2 (0; 1) measures the freenessof trade.17 As shown in Ap-
pendix A2, NE > 0 requires cX < cD to hold. Thus, only a subset of more
productive rms (with c  cX) export. All other rms (with cX < c  cD)
sell in the domestic market only. When countries are symmetric, the domes-
tic cut-o¤ under trade is lower than in autarky: by toughening competition,
which forces less e¢ cient rms to exit, trade raises aggregate productivity. A
better access to the foreign country (i.e. a larger ) reduces cD and increases
cX , whilst easier access to the home country by foreign exporters (i.e. a higher
) increases cD and reduces cX . A larger L and L reduce cD and cX , re-
spectively. This is because the tougher competition in a larger market forces
rms to price on a more elastic segment of their demand curve and to reduce
their mark-ups. Hence, a larger destination market (be it domestic or foreign)
increases the minimum productivity required to break-even. These results are
consistent with those in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
The e¤ects of the bargaining power of unions on the cut-o¤s are summarised
in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (i) An increase in v increases cD and reduces cX ; (ii) an in-
crease in v reduces cD and increases cX .
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow from inspection of (27) and (28).
A rise in v leads to relatively larger wage increases in relatively more e¢ cient
rms (since @w;v(c)=@c < 0) and hence hurts exporters relatively more than
domestic-only rms. Thus, an increase in v has a selection-softening e¤ect
in the domestic market (where the minimum e¢ ciency required to break even
falls), and a selection-toughening e¤ect for exporters (since, by increasing wages,
it increases the minimum productivity required to export). Thus: (i) rms
exporting to a country whose union power has increased face a softer competition
from domestic rms in that market; (ii) domestic rms in a market face a
tougher competition from exporters whose union power has increased. The
market structure e¤ects of an increase in v are summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 When countries are symmetric, an increase in union bargaining
power in one country: (i) reduces the mass of rms entering that country; (ii)
reduces the mass of rms exporting from that country; (iii) increases the mass
of domestic rms selling in that country, provided that  > (2 + )cD=.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
To summarize: the opening up of trade does not alter the positive relation-
ship between v and cD which results in more entry of less e¢ cient rms and
in a lower average industry productivity. However, an increase in v reduces
cX , raising the average e¢ ciency of exporters. Qualitatevely, these results are
una¤ected by the degree of market integration. However, under completely free-
trade, cD = cX and the e¤ects of union power on the equilibrium productivity
distribution is as in autarky.
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3.2.2 Wages, incomes and welfare
As is clear from (25), more productive rms pay higher wages in both their
prot centres. It is also the case that:
Proposition 4 Within an exporting rm, the export-wage is lower than the
domestic-wage.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
Thus, prot-centre level negotiations result in wage-discrimination across
the di¤erent activities of the rm, even though more productive rms pay higher
wages in both domestic and export prot-centres. This is because market seg-
mentation implies that rmsprice elasticity of demand and their wage elasticity
of labour demand are both higher in their export market (see Appendix A2).
As a result, by internalising the rms lower monopoly power in its foreign mar-
ket and the trade-o¤ that exists between wage and employment, unions have
an incentive to moderate their export wage demands to aid their rms foreign
market access.18 wD(c) and wX(c) are plotted in Figure 1 as a function of
c.19 Clearly, whilst for exporters wD(c) > wX(c), domestic-only rms pay on
average lower wages than exporters. As in Andersen and Sorensen (2008), the
export wage for the marginal exporters can be lower than the (domestic) wage
paid by the more e¢ cient non-exporting rms.
Figure 1 about here
A key result of our analysis is that trade liberalisation a¤ects intra-industry
(and within group) wage inequality both across rms (via its e¤ects on com-
petitive selection) and within rms (via wage discrimination across destination
markets).
Proposition 5 A trade liberalisation that eases access to foreign markets: (i)
reduces intra-rm and (ii) increases industry-wide wage dispersion.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
The intuition for this is as follows. Economic integration narrows the gap
in competitive pressure across markets and thus reduces the incentives for wage
discrimination within the rm.20 However, intra-industry wage dispersion (mea-
sured by the variance of wages within the industry) increases as the cost of
penetrating foreign markets falls. This result reects the e¤ects of trade lib-
eralisation on the cut-o¤s: on the one hand, a lower cD (whereby the least
e¢ cient, lower wage, rms exit) works towards a lower wage dispersion. On the
other hand, the redistribution of market shares towards the more e¢ cient rms
increases wage inequality.21
As is shown in Appendix A1, the opening up of trade between two symmetric
countries does not qualitatively alter the e¤ects of changes in union power on
welfare, which remain ambiguous. The e¤ects of trade liberalisation, however,
depend on the size of  i.e. they are not unabiguous as in Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008).
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The rm-level bargaining case in which a rm pays the same wage, wU (c),
to all its workers is derived in Appendix A4. The wages for the two bargaining
regimes are plotted in Figure A1 for the monopoly union case. The broken
dotted line wU (c) indicates that even with rm-level bargaining the wage of
the more e¢ cient non-exporters can exceed that of the least e¢ cient exporters.
Furthermore, wX(c) < wU (c) < wD(c). By internalising a rms lower monopoly
power abroad, a union has an incentive to moderate wage demands relative to
the domestic prot-centre bargaining (i.e. wU (c) < wD(c)), but a lower incentive
to aid a rms international competitiveness (thus setting wU (c) > wX(c)). As a
result, rms require a higher minimum productivity to be able to export (i.e. cX
is lower) under rm-level bargaining. Therefore, unionsacceptance of sub-rm
level decentralisation of bargaining may reect their willingness to moderate rent
extraction in favour of rent creation (by protecting employment) in activities
exposed to tougher competition.22 Via a closer link between wages and inter-
market di¤erences in competitive pressures, prot-centre level bargaining may
then allow unions to extract higher total rents. This is shown, with monopoly
unions, in Figure A.2 in Appendix A4 that plots total labour rents in the two
regimes.23
4 Conclusions
We have examined how labour market unionisation and international trade af-
fect intra-industry selection and wage inequality.
The nature of bargaining is an important channel through which trade lib-
eralisation a¤ects wage inequality. Unionisation acts as a rent-sharing mech-
anism between workers and rms and, with rm specic markups, leads to
inter-rm wage disparities (with more productive rms paying higher wages)
even with ex-ante identical workers. However, decentralisation of bargaining
at the prot-centre level, by enabling unions to better exploit the di¤erent de-
grees of market power that rms have in their domestic and export markets,
gives rise to within-rm wage inequality; by moderating rent extraction, and
protecting employment, in activities exposed to more intense foreign competi-
tion, a union can then extract a higher total labour rent than under rm level
negotiations. Hence, a testable prediction of the model is that, for a given level
of openness, decentralisation of bargaining at the sub-rm level ought to result
in exporters exhibiting higher intra-rm wage dispersion. Clearly, empirical re-
search is required to investigate the extent to which trade liberalisation a¤ects
wage dispersion across (via a competitive selection e¤ect) or within (via a wage
discrimination e¤ect) rms.
Since a unions rent extraction ability is higher in more productive rms,
an increase in union power in one country leads to relatively larger wage de-
mand increases in more e¢ cient rms, softening competition for domestic rms
(with more entry of less e¢ cient rms in the domestic market), and toughening
competition for exporters (by increasing the minimum productivity required to
export). Hence, rms exporting to a country with stronger unions face a softer
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competition from domestic rms in that market; instead, domestic rms in a
market face a tougher competition from exporters located in a country with
more powerful unions. Thus, a key testable prediction of the model is that
industries in countries where unions are stronger should be expected to have a
lower average productivity and also o¤er an easier access to foreign exporters.
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Appendix
A1. Welfare. Welfare is measured by the average indirect utility W = q0 +
B + I, where B and average income I are dened as:
B  1
2

 +

N
 1
(  p)2 + 1
2
N

2p; I 
 
V C N + L  lN =L
and where
2p = (2  v)2  (cD)2 =
h
(+ 2) (+ 1)
2
16
i
;
V C = L (2  v) (+ v) (cD)2 = [4 (+ 1) (+ 2)]
l = L (2  v) (cD)2 = [4 (+ 1) (+ 2)]
are, respectively, the variance of prices, average variable cost, and average
labour demand per-rm in the monopolistic sector. Clearly, @ W=@p < 0,
@ W=@N > 0, @ W=@2p > 0: Substituting p from (15) and 
2
p in B yields:
B = (  cD) f2  [cD (2+ v + 2)] = (+ 2)g =4 > 0 since  > cD.
The e¤ects of an increase in v on W are ambiguous: @ W=@v = @B=@v +
@ I=@v, with @B=@v < 0 and @ I=@v R 0 i¤:  R cD [2v + 4 +  (2  v)] =[ (2  v)+
4]. For a su¢ ciently large , and hence strong pro-variety e¤ects of an increase
in v, @ W=@v > 0 cannot be ruled out.
International trade does not alter the functional form of W . With symmetric
countries, V C = (2  v) (+ v)L (1 + ) (cD)2 = [4 (+ 1) (+ 2)] ; and l =
(2  v)L (1 + ) (cD)2 = [4 (+ 1) (+ 2)] which in turn imply that I is the
same as in autarky. As in autarky, the sign of @ W=@v is ambiguous. Clearly,
since cD in open economy is smaller than in autarky, the threshold level of
 at which @ I=@v > 0 is lower than in autarky. The welfare e¤ects of trade
liberalisation also depend on the size of ; specically: @ I=@ R 0 i¤  R
2cD [2 (+ 1)  3v] = [(4  3v + 6)].
A2. Mass of rms and proof of Propositions 3 and 4. Note that
pD(cD) = cD = pmax. Substituting cD and cX from (27) and (28) into the
expression for pD(c) (and its equivalent for pX(c)) in (23), and making use of
(26) yields:
p =

ND
ND +NX
(4+ v + 2) +
NX
ND +NX
(4+ v + 2)

cD
4 (+ 1)
. (29)
SubstitutingND = G(cD)NE = (cD=cM )

NE andNX = G(c

X)N

E = (c

X=cM )

NE
into (29) and given (26), (29) becomes:
p =
[NE (4+ v + 2) + 
NE (4+ v
 + 2)] cD
4 (+ 1) (NE + NE)
. (30)
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Combining (29) with (16) yields the total number of rms selling in the
country:
N = ND +N

X =

cD
cM

(NE + 
NE) . (31)
Substituting (30) and (31) into cD = (+ N p) = (N + ) (and doing the
same for the foreign country) yields a system of two equations in NE and NE
from which, for the home country, we obtain:
NE =
4 (+ 1) cM
 (2  v) (1  )
"
(  cD)
(cD)
+1   
(  cD)
(cD)
+1
#
. (32)
Recalling that cD = cX
, (32) implies that NE > 0 i¤ cX < c

D (and N

E > 0
i¤ cX < cD).
Proposition 3. Proof. Imposing symmetry on (32), we nd: @NE=@v <
0. Then NX = G(cX)NE = (cX=cM )

NE implies: @NX=@v < 0. Substituting
(32) into ND = G(cD)NE = (cD=cM )

NE yields:
ND =
4 (k + 1)
 (2  v) (1 + )
(  cD)
cD
from which: ND > 0 i¤  > cD, and @ND=@v > 0 i¤  > (2 + )cD=. If
preference for variety is su¢ ciently strong, an increase in v results in a larger
mass of domestic rms, despite the fact that it reduces the mass of entrants.
Propostion 4. Proof. Inspection of (27) and (28) reveals that for  = 
and v = v, cX < cD always holds. In the general case: cX < cD requires
(2  v)2   (2  v)2  > +2
h
(2  v)2   (2  v)2 
i
, which we impose since
cX < cD is required for entry to be positive. Then, cX < cD implies wD(c) >
wX(c):
Also note that with symmetry: pmax = pmax and cD = c

D. Thus, cX =
cD= implies that pX(c) > pD(c) and hence
Dq;p(c) = [(pmax=pD(c))  1] 1 <Xq;p(c) = [(pmax=pX(c))  1] 1. For the general case, pX(c) > pD(c) and thusDq;p(c) < Xq;p(c) hold if c > [(v + 2) (cD   cX)] = [(   1) (2  v)]. Also,Xl;w = 2c= [(2  v) (cX   c)] + v= (2  v) > Dl;w = 2c= [(2  v) (cD   c)] +
v= (2  v), since cX < cD.
A3. Proposition 5. Proof. (i): Inspection of (27) and (28) reveals that
@cD=@ < 0 and @cX=@ < 0. From (25), this implies that @wD=@ < 0 and
@wX=@ < 0. (ii) For symmetric countries, the variance of wages within the
industry is obtained by rst deriving the average industry wage:
w =

1 +
v
2 (  1)

(1 + ) (33)
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which always increases in . Making use of (33), the variance of wages in the
monopolistic sector is obtained as:
2w = (+ 1)
h
v2+ 2 (  2) (v + 2  2)2
i
4 (  1)2 (  2)
which is clearly increasing in .
A4. Wage and cut-o¤s with rm-level bargaining. With rm-level bar-
gaining, the wage wU (c) an exporter pays in both domestic and export prot-
centres is obtained by:
max
wU (c)
U = v log [(lD(c) + lX(c)) (wU (c)  1)] +
(1  v) log [D (wU (c); l(c)) + X (wU (c); lX(c))]
subject to (17) and (18). Analytical solutions for wU (c) can only be found for
v = 1:
wU (c) =
1
3
+
2
3c
LpD(c) + L
pX(c)
L+ L2
. (34)
For given productivity cut-o¤s, wU (c) can be written as a convex combination
of the prot-centre level bargaining wages:
wU (c) = wD(c) + (1  )wX(c) (35)
where  = L=
 
L+ L2

is the trade-cost-adjusted relative size of the domestic
market: the larger is the domestic economy and/or the more accessible is the
foreign market (i.e. the larger is L and the smaller is ), the closer is wU (c) to
wD(c).
In this regime, the zero-expected-prot free-entry condition is:Z cX
0
xD(c)
c 1
cM
dc+
Z cD
cX
dD(c)
c 1
cM
dc+
Z cX
0
xX(c)
c 1
cM
dc = fE
where the superscripts d and x refer to the domestic-only/exporting status of
the rm. With L = L and v = 1, the cut-o¤s and wages in the two regimes
are plotted together over the distribution of c in Figure A.1.24 wU (c) has a
discontinuity at c = cX . As with prot-level bargaining, more productive rms
pay higher wages. Also: wU (cX) > 1 for  > 1 and wU (cX) = 1 for  = 1.
Figure A.1 about here
Figure A.2 plots unionstotal labour rents in the two bargaining regimes,
obtained by substituting (34) and rms employment levels into: VU (c) =
(wU (c)  1) (lD(c) + lX(c)) and VS(c) = (wD(c)  1) lD(c)+(wX(c)  1) lX(c).25
Figure A.2 about here
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Figure 1. Prot-centre level wages: wD(c) (continuous line) and wX(c) (dashed line)
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Figure A.1. Wages
Prot-centre level bargaining (solid lines): wD(c) (thin), wX(c) (thick)
Firm level bargaining (dashed lines): wU;D(c) (thin) wU (c) (thick).
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t-centre level bargaining (solid line), 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Notes
1See for instance Menezes-Filho et al (2008) and Schank et al (2007) and references therein.
2See among others: Autor et al (2008), McCall (2000), Barth and Lucifora (2006), Goos
and Manning (2007) and Dustmann et al (2009).
3 In Germany, opening clauses authorise companies to opt-out of national negotiations
(Jürgens 2008). In Italy, a progressive decentralisation of bargaining culminated in 2011 in
the agreement at FIATs Miraori plant widely recognised as paving the way to a widespread
move towards sub-rm level negotiations outside industry wide frameworks. In the UK, the
tendency towards bargaining decentralisation to the sub-rm level is evident since the early
1980s (Brown 1987). Company or plant level bargaining characterise Canada, Japan, Korea,
the United States, New Zealand, and in Mexico (e.g. Tuman 2003).
4Montagna (2001) studies the e¤ects of trade liberalization on selection with inter-country
di¤erences in rmsproductivity distributions. Melitz (2003) introduces a xed export cost in
the presence of uncertainty about post-entry e¢ ciency and shows how only more productive
rms self-select into an export status. For recent reviews of the literature, see Helpman (2006)
and Redding (2010).
5Within an e¢ ciency wage model, in Davis and Harrigan (2011) inter-rm wage dispersion
arises from di¤erent monitoring technologies. In Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), a fair-wage
e¤ort mechanism results in productivity specic wages. Hiring and ring rigidities in Helpman
and Itskhoki (2010) can result in wage inequality if a non-linear hiring function is assumed;
in Helpman et al (2010) wage dispersion arises from heterogeneity of workers in unobservable
ability. Felbermayr, et al (2008), in a model with search frictions, nd that rms with di¤erent
productivities pay similar wages regardless of the bargaining environment.
6To ensure positive consumption of the numeraire, we assume: I >
Z
i2~

p(i)q(i)di.
7Di¤erent employment congurations are possible (e.g. with employment in only one of
the sectors, or in more than one monopolistic rm). For simplicity, we rule out these cases
by assumption as they would not substantially alter the qualitative nature of the results.
8 Income only depends on labour income since no aggregate prots will be shown to persist
in equilibrium.
9Unionisation could be introduced in this sector as well. However, by absorbing the labour
supply in excess of what employed by the monopolistic rms, this sector serves as an anchor
in the model and xes the reservation wage to the level that clears the labour market. Union-
isation in this sector would result in aggregate unemployment and require another mechanism
to x the reservation wage  the most plausible being an unemployment benet which, in
turn, would require taxation and a government budget constraint. Although interesting, this
case goes beyond the aims of this paper.
10The monopoly union model and the no-union case considered in Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) correspond to v = 1 and v = 0, respectively.
11This is equivalent to assuming that a rm would have to stop production in case of a
break-down of negotiations.
12A su¢ cient condition for cD < cM to hold is that
q
[8 (+ 1) (+ 2) fE ]=[L (2  v)2] <
cM , which we impose.
13A key di¤erence with Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) is that welfare here depends on both
market size and mass of rms.
14The British company Coats Viyella PLC opted out of national industry negotiations in
1989 and decentralised bargaining to 16 prot centres (covering multiple or individual plants,
or only specic production lines within individual plants) dened on the basis of the customer
base and market pressures facing the di¤erent activities of the rm (Leopold and Jackson
2001).
15For a more detailed analysis of the rm-level bargaining regime, see Montagna and Nocco
(2011).
16For the foreign country the expressions for the cut-o¤s are symmetric.
17The conditions for cD > 0 and cX > 0 are respectively (2  v)2 > (2  v)2  and
(2  v)2 > (2  v)2  which we impose.
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18This result is similar to that obtained in an oligopoly setting by Bastos and Kreickemeier
(2009).
19These curves are obtained for symmetric countries and for ranges of c over which rms
are active: c 2 [0; cX ] and c 2 [0; cD]. Parameter values are: v = 0:5,  = 2,  = 0:2,
 = 6, cM = 10, L = 100, fE = 1,  = 1:118. The cut-o¤s emerging at these values are:
cD = 1:4756 and cX = 1:3199
20Whilst an increase in  (i.e. a bilateral and symmetric trade liberalisation or a unilateral
liberalisation by the foreign country) reduces the di¤erence in demand elasticity in the two
markets, an increase in , that makes it easier for foreign rms to access the home mar-
ket increases intra-rm wage inequality. These e¤ects of trade liberalisation on wages are
also consistent with those obtained (both theoretically and empirically), by Amiti and Davis
(2011).
21Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) obtain a similar result. They measure wage dispersion as
the ratio of the average to the lowest wage in the industry. Since we have wD = wX = 1,
their measure in our paper corresponds to w which is also increasing in .
22 In Aidt and Sena (2005) incentives for rent creation are higher in rms exposed to more
intense market competition. In Naylor (2000) unions trade-o¤ wage reductions for employment
gains from foreign markets.
23Unions in this model would prefer prot-centre level negotiations. However, if wage in-
equality was a concern, the two regimes would present them with a trade-o¤ between wage
dispersion and total labour rent.
24Parameter values: v = 1,  = 2,  = 0:2,  = 6, cM = 10, L = 100, fE = 1,  = 1:118.
With prot-centre bargaining: cD = 1:8072 and cX = 1:616 5; with rm-level bargaining:
cD = 1:7701 and cX = 1:5002.
25Parameter values: v = 1,  = 2,  = 0:2,  = 6, cM= 10, L = 100, fE= 1,  = 1:118.
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